The Rise and Fall of the Entire Controversy Doctrine
as Applied to Attorney Malpractice Actions
INTRODUCTION

The entire controversy doctrine is a NewJersey rule of civil procedure that requires all legal issues involved in a controversy to be
resolved in one judicial proceeding.' It mandates the joinder of all
related claims and parties with a material interest in the outcome of
The doctrine, which began as a practical rule ina legal action
tended to promote fairness and judicial efficiency, was radically expanded in Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, where the
Supreme Court of New Jersey announced that the doctrine would
apply in the context of attorney malpractice actions.4 That application spurred tremendous controversy and confusion within the New
Jersey bar Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court overruled itSee Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 15, 560 A.2d 1169, 1172 (1989); see
also Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 431, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (1997) (holding that
"the entire controversy doctrine seeks to assure that all aspects of a legal dispute occur in a single lawsuit."); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142
NJ. 280, 289, 662 A.2d 509, 513 (1995) (explaining that the entire controversy doctrine requires adjudication of a legal dispute in one court proceeding).
See Gogdel 116 NJ. at 15, 560 A.2d at 1172.
142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995).
4 See id. at 289, 662 A.2d at 513 (holding that the entire controversy doctrine
obligates a client to assert any legal malpractice claims against his attorney in the
underlying legal action or forfeit his right to sue that attorney in a later action).
The Circle Chevrolet decision was accompanied by three other decisions pertaining to
the entire controversy doctrine, all expanding its scope. See generally Mortgagelinq
Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Tide Ins. Co., 142 NJ. 336, 344, 662 A.2d 536, 540
(1995) (dismissing plaintiffs claim under the entire controversy doctrine where
related action had been brought in federal court in another state); Mystic Isle Dev.
Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 326, 662 A.2d 523, 531 (1995) (holding
that the entire controversy doctrine barred a real estate developer from bringing a
malpractice action against its attorney); Ditrolio v. Antiles, 142 NJ. 253, 278-80, 662
A.2d 494, 507-08 (1995) (concluding that entire controversy doctrine barred action
against defendants despite the fact that initial action had been resolved in settlement, without a trial on the merits). These four decisions have been affectionately
referred to in legal circles as "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse." Dana Coleman, Entire-Controversy Cntrovrsy: PanelistsDecry FalloutFromHigh Court Ruling, NJ.
I.Aw., Apr. 22, 1996, at 3.
See Albert L. Cohn & Terri A. Smith, Practice and Malpractice after Circle Chev-
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self by carving out an exception to the entire controversy doctrine
for attorney malpractice actions.6 Despite critics' assessments that
the supreme court should have abandoned the doctrine completely,
the entire controversy doctrine still remains a viable rule of New Jersey civil procedure.7
This Note will explore the impact that the entire controversy
doctrine has had on litigation in New Jersey, specifically in the arena
rolet, in SFi-mNAR MATERiAL ENm

Corrovzs, DocTrN: NawJEsEY lNnSTrrUT.

FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 23, 23 (1996) [hereinafter SEmn,4AR MATEuAL

ETreE CoTraovEwsDocruNE] (on file with the Seton Ha/ Law Review) (noting that
"[w] hat began as a common-sensical procedural rule, intended to cut down on the
number of cases filed by requiring joinder of claims and parties, has become a
source of concern and confusion for the practicing attorney"). For a detailed analysis of criticism of the entire controversy doctrine in the context of attorney malpractice, see infranotes 80-138 and accompanying text.
6 See Donohue v. Kuhn, 150 NJ. 484, 485, 696 A.2d 664, 664-65 (1997); Karpovich v. Barbarula, 150 NJ. 473, 476, 696 A.2d 659, 660 (1997); Olds, 150 NJ. at
442-46, 696 A.2d at 643-45; see also Ronald B. Grayzel, Correctingthe Mistakes of the
Past: The Court Looks Back on Some PriorDecisions and Reformulates its Position, NJ. LJ.,
Sept. 1, 1997, at S-6 (noting that as a result of heated debate in the profession, "the
Court overruled Circle Chevrolet... and signaled an intention to re-examine its entire commitment to the compulsoryjoinder of parties to the entire controversy doctrine.").
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 473, 696 A.2d at 659 (Stein,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the court should overrule Cogde/l rather than simply
carve out an exception for attorney malpractice claims). Justice Stein posited that
the root of the problem does not lie in the doctrine's application to
attorney-malpractice claims. Rather, the fundamental flaw in [the
court's] approach to partyjoinder is that the preclusive aspect of the
entire controversy doctrine is not the appropriate mechanism to enforce whatever level of mandatory party joinder the Court ultimately
deems to be essential.
Id. at 451, 696 A.2d at 647 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The justice opined that the court's ruling in Cogde was erroneous and, further, that
merely exempting legal malpractice claims from the preclusive effect of the entire
controversy doctrine does not eliminate the numerous problems associated with the
doctrine. See id. at 452, 696 A.2d at 647 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Donohue, 150 N.J. at 488, 696 A.2d at 666 (Stein, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that the entire controversy doctrine should be
abolished altogether); Karpovh, 150 N.J. at 483, 696 A.2d at 664 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating the same).
The majority opinion in Olds also recognized the problems associated with the
entire controversy doctrine beyond the context of attorney malpractice actions, but
declined to overrule Cogdel See Olds, 150 N.J. at 440-43, 696 A.2d at 641-43. Instead, the majority indicated that it would reserve consideration of abandoning the
entire controversy doctrine altogether until its biennial review of proposed amendments to the NewJersey Rules of Civil Practice. See id. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644. The
court explained that it will rely on recommendations from the Committee on Civil
Practice's subcommittee on the Entire Controversy Doctrine, as well as comments
from the bar in determining whether to disregard the entire controversy doctrine
or amend Rule 4:30A. See id. at 446, 449, 696 A.2d at 644, 646.
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of attorney malpractice actions. Part I defines the doctrine and articulates its purposes. Part II explores the history of the entire controversy doctrine from the first rules of partyjoinder to the doctrine
as it exists today. Part III details the criticisms of applying the doctrine to attorney malpractice actions. Part IV focuses on the NewJersey Supreme Court's eventual decision to overrule itself and exempt
attorney malpractice actions from the doctrine. Finally, Part V predicts future developments for the doctrine.
I.

WHAT IS THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE?

The entire controversy doctrine requires mandatory joinder of
all causes, claims, and defenses stemming from the same underlying
cause of action between parties involved in litigation.! It mandates
that plaintiffs litigate all claims and join all parties in one action
rather than in several separate actions. 9 The purposes of the doctrine include (1) the need for finality through the avoidance of
piecemeal decisions, (2) fairness to all material parties to the action,
and (3) judicial efficiency and the avoidance of delay. ° The NewJersey Supreme Court reasoned that the entire controversy doctrine
would promote judicial economy and fairness to defendants by requiring all potential claims arising out of the same underlying event
to bejoined in a single suit."
See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 16, 560 A.2d 1169, 1173 (1989). The
doctrine operates in a manner similar to the principle of res judicata. See Susan
Carboni, NewJersey Developments, The Entire Controversy Opinions of 1995 and Attorney Malpractice: What Price Economy in New Jerseyl 48 RUTGu L. Rxv. 1273, 1274
(1996) (opining that "[t]he doctrine is a close cousin to the principle of resjudicata, though broader in scope"). For a detailed analysis of the principle of resjudicata in the context of mandatoryjoinder, see David C. Zuckerbrot, Comment, MandatotyJoinderof Parties: The Wave of the Future,43 RlrGms L. REv. 53, 66-69 (1990)
(explaining that res judicata is a procedural device used to bar claims previously
litigated).
See Mystic Isle, 142 N.J. at 322, 662 A.2d at 529; see also Gage Andretta, Move
Carefully Through the Court's Entire Controversy Doctrine Minefeld, N.J. L.J., Feb. 19,
1996, at 10; Rocco Cammarere, Circle Chevrolet Rattles Attorneys, NJ. LAw., Feb. 26,
1996, at 1.
10 See Ditrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (1995); see also
Olds, 150 N.J. at 431, 696 A.2d at 637 (holding that "the goals of the doctrine are to
promote judicial efficiency, assure fairness to all parties with a material interest in
an action, and encourage the conclusive determination of a legal controversy");
CogdI4 116 N.J. at 15, 560 A.2d at 1173 (stating that "the entire controversy doctrine has evolved to 'eliminate delay, prevent harassment of a party and unnecessary
clogging of the judicial system, avoid wasting the time and effort of the parties, and
promote fundamental fairness'") (citation omitted).
1 See Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 289, 662
A.2d 509, 513 (1995); see also Henry Gottlieb, Appellate PanelFurtherLoosens Circle's
8
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Essentially, the doctrine is a rule of preclusion. It effectuates
its goals by barring a party from bringing subsequent claims when
that party failed to join any related parties or claims in the original
action.'
The preclusive effect of the entire controversy doctrine
serves to avoid prejudice to parties not joined in the original suit. 4
The doctrine, however, is not absolute. Under certain circumstances,
in the interest of fairness to all parties involved and at the discretion
of the court, the preclusive effect of the entire controversy doctrine

can be discarded in order to provide every party with a reasonable
opportunity to have his or her claim litigated.

Strictures, NJ. L.J.,July 1, 1996, at 3 (stating that the doctrine furthers judicial economy and fairness by mandating that each potential defendant and claim be disclosed as soon as they become known to the plaintiff).
12 See Kevin P. Duffy, Sweeping Ru Changes Take Effect Next Month, N.J.
L.J., Aug.
9, 1990, at 12 (stating that the entire controversy doctrine imposes the consequence
of claim preclusion for failure to join particular claims or parties). Duffy suggests
that the entire controversy doctrine does not require joinder of a party in order to
proceed with the initial action; however, failure to do so will bar any suit against that
party. See id.; see also Editorial, Forswearingthe Merits, N.J. L.J., Sept. 4, 1995, at 24
(noting that "the doctrine commands the joinder in a single action of all claims,
against all parties, generated by every controversy implicated by each of the claims
in suit" or the claim is precluded).
is See Duffy, supra note 12, at 11 (stating that the penalty for failing to comply
with the mandates of the entire controversy doctrine is preclusion).
4 See Andretta, supra note 9, at 10 (pointing out that one purpose of barring
a
subsequent action against defendants who were not joined in the initial suit is to
avoid prejudice to those defendants because of their absence in the earlier proceed-

ing).

See Cogdeg 116 N.J. at 27-28, 560 A.2d at 1169 (emphasizing that "[any possible unfairness to litigants, confusion in the presentation of issues, administrative
unmanageability, or distortion in the truth-determining process that may result
from compulsoryjoinder of parties... can be eliminated or at least minimized by a
trial court possessed of the discretion to excuse joinder or to order severance'); see
also Circl Chevroet, 142 N.J. at 293, 662 A.2d at 515 (holding that "[tihe trial court
is vested with the authority and responsibility to devise a litigation plan that is efficient and fair to all parties").
Following the decision in Circl Chevroet there were several NewJersey cases in
which the entire controversy doctrine did not act as a bar to a subsequent action.
See, e.g., Joel v. Morrocco, 147 N.J. 546, 547, 688 A.2d 1036, 1037 (1997) (finding
that the entire controversy doctrine did not mandate the joinder of individual partners in zoning dispute in order to enforce the partners' monetary obligations in a
subsequent action); Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 661, 684
A.2d 1385, 1393 (1996) (holding that an adverse finding by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission with regard to employee's employment discrimination
claim did not bar a subsequent claim by employee under New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination); B.F. & KL.F. v. Division of Youth & Family Servs., 296 N.J. Super.
372, 380, 686 A.2d 1249, 1253 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that the entire controversy
doctrine was inapplicable to action brought by the Division of Youth and Family
Services).
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EVOLUTION OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE

A. Early Law
The origins of the entire controversy doctrine precede the
merger of the courts of law and equity in NewJersey." Accordingly,
the earliest references to the entire controversy doctrine can be
found in decisions handed down before the enactment of the 1947
NewJersey Constitution." These decisions focused primarily on the
division between courts of law and equity. The courts interpreted
the entire controversy doctrine as preventing a single controversy
from being litigated twice, once in the courts of law and once in the
courts of equity.' Thus, early use of the term "entire controversy"
had a different purpose and meaning than its use in modem lawY
In 1947, a constitutional provision merged the New Jersey
courts of law and equity. 21 The New Jersey Supreme Court then in16

See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 432, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (1997).

17 See, e.g., Mantell v. International Plastics Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J. Eq. 379,

393 (1947) (holding that "[i]t is the settled rule that where equity has rightfully assumed jurisdiction over a cause for any purpose, it may ordinarily retain the cause
for all purposes, and proceed to a final determination of the entire controversy, and
establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies"); Smith v. Red Top Taxicab
Corp., 111 NJ.L. 439, 440-41 (1983) (opining that "a single or entire cause of action cannot be subdivided into several claims, and separate actions maintained
thereon"); Broad St. Nat'l Bank v. Holden, 109 N.J. Eq. 253, 256, 156 A. 827, 828
(1981) (stating that while all trust beneficiaries should have been joined in the bill,
failure to do so should not result in dismissal of the case); Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N.J.
Eq. 576, 579 (1870) (concluding that "courts of equity have concurrentjurisdiction
with courts of law in cases of private nuisances; the interference of the former in any
particular case beingjustified on the ground... of preventing multiplicity of suits")
(citations omitted).
is See, e.g., Mantell, 141 N.J. Eq. at 393 (finding that an equity
court can grant
legal rights and remedies in order to resolve the entire controversy in one proceeding and avoid multiple litigation); Smith, 111 N.J.L. at 440-41 (holding that the entire controversy should be litigated in one court action); Caris/e, 21 N.J. Eq. at 579
(addressing the issue of whether equity courts could interfere with a nuisance acdon when the controversy had already been brought in a court of law).
19 See Carboni, supra note 8, at 1277 (arguing that the constitutional
provision
enacted in 1947 merely codified "a familiar equitable principle: once a court of equity hasjurisdiction over a cause of action, it decides legal as well as equitable matters.").
20 See Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., An ExaminationBefore and Behind
the 'EntireControversy Doctrine,"in SEMiNAR MATERiAL: ENirnR CoRmovEm DOCTRINE, supra note 5, at
85, 39 (proposing that the 1947 constitution made early cases concerning litigation
of the "entire controversy" in one proceeding obsolete by merging the courts of law
and equity).
21 See NJ. CoNsr., art. VI, § 3,
4. The constitutional provision states:
Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the
Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the
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terpreted the 1947 constitutional provision as mandating the adjudication of an entire legal controversy in one proceeding. 2 Critics of
this interpretation have argued, however, that the 1947 constitution
merely effectuated the merger of the courts of law and equity and
did not in anyway authorize a preclusive joinder rule. In fact, most
of the early problems concerning litigation of the proverbial "entire
controversy" in one judicial proceeding were eliminated following
the abolition of separate law and equity courts. The issues of claim
or partyjoinder were simply not addressed.

other division when the ends ofjustice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.
Id. This provision, while merging the law and equity into one court with comprehensive jurisdiction, still provided for separate law and equity divisions within the
court. See Hazard, supra note 20, at 35.
n See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 15, 560 A.2d 1169, 1172-73 (1989)
(declaring that "the [entire controversy] doctrine has become such a fundamental
aspect ofjudicial administration, it has achieved constitutional confirmation."). See
generally Carboni, supra note 8, at 1278-87 (describing the history of the entire controversy doctrine); Kevin Haverty, Note, The Entire Controversy Doctrine in New Jersey
and the Nominal Party Exception: Wen is the Entire Controversy not the Entire Controversy. , 23 RUrGs L.J. 341, 344-45 (stating that the 1947 New Jersey Constitution is
the source of the entire controversy doctrine).
2
See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 453-54, 696 A.2d 633, 648 (1997) (Stein,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the New Jersey Supreme
Court has misinterpreted the purpose of the 1947 constitutional provision). Justice
Stein stated that "any misperception that the preclusive application of the entire
controversy doctrine to mandatory party joinder is in some respect authorized or
even encouraged by the 1947 constitution permanently should be dispelled" because the purpose of the constitutional provision was to effectuate the merger of the
courts of law and equity. Id. Justice Stein pointed out that early cases applying the
1947 constitutional provision demonstrated that it was enacted to merge the courts
of law and equity. See id. at 454, 696 A.2d at 648 (Stein, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Zuckerbrot, supra note 8, at 69-73 (describing the early
use of the entire controversy doctrine).
24 See Olds, 150 NJ. at 454, 696 A.2d at 648.
Even after the entire controversy
doctrine received constitutional confirmation, early decisions concerning this doctrine continued to focus on conflicts between legal and equitable issues. See O'Neill
v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 164-65, 77 A.2d 899, 901-02 (1951) (discussing the power of
either court to grant both legal and equitable relief); State v. Jones, 4 NJ. 374, 383,
72 A.2d 872, 876 (1950) (stating that it was "quite impossible for a litigant to go on
to trial in one Division of the Superior Court and then assert, after judgment, a
right to be heard, except on appeal, in another"); Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 378,
66 A.2d 719, 724 (1949) (holding that when a plaintiff seeks both a legal and an
equitable remedy, the chancery court has the authority to adjudicate both the legal
and equitable issues in order to resolve the entire controversy in one proceeding).

1298

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1292

B. MandatoryJoinderof Claims
It took years for the entire controversy doctrine to evolve into
the present rule that compels compulsory joinder of both parties and
claims in one action. The initial growth of the entire controversy
doctrine occurred in the area of mandatory joinder of claims." A
body of common law developed that continually expanded the doctrine's application to claim joinder, eventually including defenses
and counterclaims." Ultimately, the entire controversy doctrine became "a mandatory rule for thejoinder of virtually all causes, claims,
and defenses relating to a controversy between the parties engaged
in litigation."" In 1979, the Supreme Court of New Jersey promulgated a rule of civil procedure requiring joinder of all claims arising
from the same underlying transaction involving those parties already
named in the lawsuit.8 This rule referred only to compulsory joinder of claims and did not addressjoinder of parties."
See, e.g., Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5, 462 A.2d 133, 134-35
(1983) (opining that the entire controversy doctrine was meant to apply to the
joinder of claims rather than the joinder of parties); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist
Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 559-60, 428 A.2d 1254, 1258-59 (1981) (concluding that the
entire controversy doctrine does not preclude a second action for failure to join
parties).
See, e.g., Korffv. G & G Corp., 21 N.J. 558, 571-72, 122 A.2d 889, 896 (1956)
(holding that the entire controversy doctrine applied to a defendant's counterclaim
against a nonresident plaintiff who voluntarily brought a lawsuit in this state); Vacca
v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471, 476, 122 A.2d 619, 622 (1956) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine included the joinder of representative parties necessary for the presentation and resolution of claims); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 488, 103 A.2d
9, 12 (1954) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine includes affirmative
claims that could be brought as counterclaims); Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303,
312-13, 78 A.2d 572, 576-77 (1951) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine
encompasses the joinder of defenses); Win. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co.,
150 N.J. Super. 277, 294-95, 375 A.2d 675, 684 (App. Div. 1977) (determining that
the entire controversy doctrine requires defendants to assert all cross-claims and
counterclaims arising out of the underlying transaction).
CogdeI4 116 NJ. at 16, 560 A.2d at 1173.
SeeN.J. Cr. R. 4:27-1(b) (amended 1990). The rule states:
Each party to an action shall assert therein a/ claims which he may
have against any other party thereto insofar as may be required by application of the entire controversy doctrine.
Id. (emphasis added). In 1990, this paragraph was deleted from the claim joinder
rule and the rule was amended to its current form:
Subject to R. 4:30A (entire controversy doctrine), the plaintiff in the
complaint or in an answer to a counterclaim denominated as such and
the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join, either as independent or alternate claims, as many claims, either legal
or equitable or both, as he or she may have against an opposing party.
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties
if the requirements of R. 4:28 (joinder of parties), R. 4:29 (joinder of
25
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C. MandatoryJoinder of Parties

In contrast to claimjoinder, the expansion of the entire controversy doctrine to mandatory joinder of parties was a slower process.30
Initially, the entire controversy doctrine was not applied in the context of partyjoinder.q' Instead, under the common law, partyjoinder
was mandatory only as to "indispensable" parties." Thus, parties who
multiple parties), and R. 4:31 (interpleader) are satisfied. There may
be a like joinder of crossclaims or third-party claims if the requirements of R. 4:7 (counterclaim and cross-claim) and R. 4:8 (third-party
practice) respectively are satisfied.
Id.
See id. See generally Hazard, supra note 20, at 48 (arguing that the adoption of
Rule 4:27-1(b) was essentially a standard res judicata doctrine and did not form a
basis for the concept of partyjoinder).
See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 433, 696 A.2d 633, 638 (1997).
S1 See Thorton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5, 462 A.2d 133, 134-35 (1983)
(holding entire controversy doctrine was meant to apply to mandatory joinder of
claims and is not applicable to mandatory joinder of parties); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 559, 428 A.2d 1254, 1258-59 (1981) (explaining that
entire controversy doctrine should not automatically be applied in the context of
mandatory joinder of parties so as to bar claims against parties not joined in the
original action). But see Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 96 N.J. 336, 343, 476 A.2d 250,
253 (1984) (refusing to apply the entire controversy doctrine retroactively to party
joinder but holding thatjoinder of parties in a single action should be effectuated
where possible).
a See Ctispin, 96 N.J. at 344, 476 A.2d at 254 (holding that "compulsory joinder
extends only to parties without whom litigation cannot feasibly proceed"). A party
is deemed indispensable when that party "has an interest inevitably involved in the
subject matter before the court and ajudgment cannot justly be made between the
litigants without either adjudging or necessarily affecting the absentee's interest."
Allen B. DuMont Lab., Inc. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 30 N.J. 290, 298, 152 A.2d 841,
845 (1959). In Sheilds v. Barrow, the Supreme Court declared that a party is indispensable when that party's interest in the controversy is "of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience." 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1854).
The NewJersey Court Rules eventually codified this standard. Thus, Rule 4:281 provides:

(a)

PERSONS TO BEJOINFD IF FEAsiBLE.

A person who is subject to serv-

ice of process shall be joined as a party to the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest in the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may either (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or other inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order
that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant.
(b) DIsPOsMoN BY COURT iFJoiNDER NOT FEASIBLE. If a person should
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were not indispensable, but whose participation in the action was
only deemed to be "necessary and proper," were not required to be
joined in the action." Although "necessary and proper" parties had
a recognized interest in the litigation, this interest could be sepaM
rated from the existing action."
Gradually, the New Jersey judiciary began to move away from
the common-law practice of excluding partyjoinder from the entire
controversy doctrine." New Jersey courts articulated practical reasons for making party joinder mandatory under the entire controIn Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk," the New Jersey Suversy doctrine.'
be joined pursuant to R. 4:28-1(a) but cannot be served with process,
the court shall determine whether it is appropriate for the action to
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be
considered by the court include: first, the extent to which ajudgment
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to that person
or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for non-joinder.
N.J. Cr. R. 4:28-1.
See Sheilds, 58 U.S. at 189. "Necessary parties" have been defined as
"[pIersons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties,
in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the
rights involved in it." Id. The Supreme Court clarified that if the parties' interests
.are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons
not before the court," then the parties were deemed necessary rather than indispensable. Id.
34 See Codgell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7, 20, 560 A.2d 1169, 1175
(1989); see
also Aetna, 85 N.J. at 558, 428 A.2d at 1258 (finding that the entire controversy doctrine will not act to bar a subsequent action for failure to join a party with an interest in the action); McFadden v. Turner, 159 N.J. Super. 360, 369, 388 A.2d 244, 248
(App. Div. 1978) (holding that "the entire controversy doctrine is a rule of mandatoryjoinder of claims, not parties.*).
See, e.g., Aetna, 85 N.J. at 559, 428 A.2d at 1259 (conceding that "under some
circumstances the failure of a party to be joined or to intervene in a prior action
should, after adjudication, bar a second action against that party involving the same
subject matter."); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 601, 258 A.2d 697, 705
(1969) (holding thatjoinder of both the manufacturer and retailer in a products
liability action would be more practical than having separate actions against each
party); McFadden, 159 N.J. Super at 372-73, 888 A.2d at 250 (Bidler, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that extending the entire controversy doctrine to include the joinder
of necessary and proper parties was compelled "by both the logic and basis of the
Doctrine").
so See Aetna, 85 N.J. at 559, 428 A.2d at 1259; Newmark, 54 N.J. at 601, 258 A-2d at
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preme Court first recognized that the entire controversy doctrine
could bar a subsequent action against a party who had a material interest in a pending action, but who had not been joined in that action.3 Following Crispin, the court promulgated Rule 4:5-1, a rule of
pleading that requires partyjoinder in limited circumstances."9 The
Crispin court, however, did not make the preclusive effects of the entire controversy doctrine mandatory. 40 Rather, the court held that
failure to join a party in a pending action could later bar a subsequent action against the absent party.4 '
The key decision in the area of party joinder finally came in
Cogdell v. Hospital Center,42 where the court expanded the reach of the
entire controversy doctrine to make joinder of parties compulsory. 43
In Cogdell, the plaintiffs sued two doctors for negligence (1) in performing a Cesarean Section and (2) in subsequent resuscitation efdefects."
forts to the newborn infant that resulted in severe birth
The action proceeded to trial and resulted in a jury verdict for the
defendants. The plaintiffs then brought a second action against a
new set of defendants: the hospital where the birth occurred and
several of its administrators." The plaintiffs claimed that the new defendants negligently failed to assemble a qualified operating team in
31 96 NJ. 337, 343, 476 A.2d 250, 253 (1984).
See id. Despite the New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition that the entire
controversy doctrine should be applicable to partyjoinder, the court refused to extend the entire controversy doctrine outright because doing so would invoke problems of retroactivity. See id., 476 A.2d at 254.
39
See NJ. C. R. 4:5-1(b) (2). The rule provides:
Each party shall include with the first pleading a certification as to
whether the matter in controversy is the subject of any other action
pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, or
whether any other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated;
and, if so, the certification shall identify such actions and all parties
thereto. Further, each party shall disclose in the certification the
names of any other party who should be joined in the action. Each
party shall have a continuing obligation during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties and with the court an
amended certification if there is a change in the facts stated in the
original certification. The court may compel the joinder of parties in
appropriate circumstances, either upon its own motion or that of a
party.
Id.
4o See C-spin, 96 NJ. at 343, 476 A.2d at
253.
41

See id.

116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989).
See id. at26, 560 A.2d at 1178.
See id. at 9, 560 A.2d at 1169.
4
See id.
a See id, 560A.2d at 1170.
43
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a reasonable amount of time. 7 In response, the hospital and its codefendants claimed that the entire controversy doctrine barred this
second action."
The supreme court declared that the entire controversy doctrine encompassed the mandatory joinder of parties." The court
reasoned that "to the extent possible courts must determine an entire controversy in a single judicial proceeding and that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims
between parties, but also joinder of all persons who have a material
interest in the controversy."" The court recognized the problems
that would emerge following such a radical extension of the doctrine, but concluded that the benefits of judicial fairness and economy significantly outweighed any potential problems."
Turning to the case at hand, the court emphasized that during
the plaintiffs' initial action against the doctors there was clear information indicating the hospital's negligence. 2 Therefore, the plaintiffs were on notice that the hospital and its administrators were po-

SSeeid.
4

See Cogd1, 116 NJ. at 13, 560 A.2d at 1171.

9 See id. at 26, 560 A.2d at 1178.
Wo Id.
51

See id. at 27, 560 A.2d at 1179. The Supreme Court of New Jersey did not

hesitate to establish limits on when the doctrine's mandatory joinder rule would be
applicable. Accordingly the court stated:
[Its limits] are reached when the joinder would result in significant
unfairness or jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and ajust
result. Implicit in the development of the entire controversy doctrine
is the recognition that the economies and the efficient administration
ofjustice should not be achieved at the expense of these paramount
concerns.... Any possible unfairness to litigants, confusion in the
presentation of issues, administrative unmanageability, or distortion
in the truth-determining process that may result from compulsory
joinder of parties-or claims-can be eliminated or at least minimized
by a trial court possessed of the discretion to excuse joinder or to order severance.
Id. at 27-28, 560 A.2d at 1179. The Cogdel/court based its interpretation of mandatory party joinder upon notions of "judicial economy and avoidance of waste, efficiency and the reduction of delay, fairness to parties, the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of 'piecemeal decisions.'" Id. at 15, 560 A.2d
at 1173; see alsoJohn Scott Hickman, Note, Efficiency, Fairnessand Common Sense: The
Case for One Action as to Percentage of Fault in Comaative NegligenceJurisdictions that
Have Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REv. 739, 754-55
(1995) (describing the motivating factors behind the Cogdell decision).
52 See Cogdell 116 N.J. at 10-11, 560 A.2d at 1170-71.
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tential defendants." The court, however, refused to apply the rule
retroactively to the case at bar."'
Nonetheless, history had been made. After Cogdell it became
evident that parties to an action must present every claim against any
other named or potential party, with preclusion as the penalty for
omitting to join either a claim or a party." Following Cogdell, the Supreme Court of New Jersey codified the entire controversy doctrine
as Rule 4:30A.'
D. Circle Chevrolet and its Progeny: Application of the Entire
ControversyDoctrine to Attorney MalpracticeActions
After the Cogdell decision and the subsequent adoption of Rule
4:30A, the New Jersey Supreme Court continued to expand the entire controversy doctrine. In 1995, four decisions pronounced by the
court radically expanded the entire controversy doctrine and had a
profound effect on mandatory joinder of parties.57 The four decisions illustrate the NewJersey Supreme Court's firm commitment to
upholding the entire controversy doctrine."3 The principle holding
5 &eid.
See id. at 28, 560 A.2d at 1179. It should be noted that some critics of Cogdel
have proposed that the case should have been decided under the doctrine of res
judicata rather than the entire controversy doctrine. See Hazard, supra note 20, at
49 (proposing that the plaintiff's action could have been precluded under the doctrine of resjudicata).
See Forswearingthe Merits, supra note 12, at 24 (stating that the result of Cogdel
was the requirement that parties to an action must assert all claims against all potential parties and the penalty for failing to do so was preclusion of the claim).
See NJ. Or. R. 4:30A. Rule 4:30A codified the entire controversy doctrine:
Nonjoinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire
controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted
claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine except as otherwise provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R.
4:67-4(a) (leave required for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions).
Id.; see also Duffy, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that R. 4:30Awas enacted in order
to ensure that members of the bar do not overlook the entire controversy doctrine
and the Cogdell decision).
57 See Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co., 142 N.J. 336,
336, 662 A.2d 536, 536 (1995); Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perski & Nehmad, 142 NJ.
310, 310, 662 A.2d 523, 523 (1995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran &
Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 280, 662 A.2d 509, 509 (1995); Ditrolio v. Antiles, 142 NJ. 253,
253, 662 A.2d 494, 494 (1995).
See generally Carboni, supra note 8, at 1276 (describing the supreme court's
solid commitment to expansion of the entire controversy doctrine); see also Russ
Bleemer, Frst Thing You Do, Sue All the Lanyers, NJ. LJ., Aug. 7, 1995, at 1 (arguing
that these four opinions asserted the entire controversy doctrine's vitality and importance).
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of the four cases was that all parties related to an underlying event
must be joined in one single action even if the claims against the respective parties are completely unrelated.' Although the four decisions profoundly affected the scope of the entire controversy doctrine, Circle Chevrolet was the most controversial by affirmatively
declaring that the doctrine would be applicable to attorney malpractice actions.'
The supreme court's decision in Circle Chevrolet required attorney malpractice actions to be joined in the litigation giving rise to
the malpractice claim.86 In Circle Chevrolet the defendant law firm,
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla (Giordano), represented the plaintiff in
drafting a thirty-year leasing agreement.62 Giordano made a miscalculation in the document that resulted in the plaintiff overpaying its
rent." Giordano then represented the plaintiff in a suit for reformation of the lease." Giordano was neverjoined in the initial reformation action, despite that the plaintiff was aware of the firm's potential
negligence in failing to discover the miscalculations in the lease.'
Following the conclusion of the reformation action in the plaintiff's
favor, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against Giordano."
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, barred the plaintiffs claim against Giordano, reasoning that the defendant should
have been joined in the initial reformation action.67 Circle Chevrolet
determined that the entire controversy doctrine operated to bar attorney malpractice actions that were not joined in the underlying
litigation even if the attorney represented the plaintiff in that action." The court reasoned that applying the entire controversy doctrine in this context furthered judicial efficiency and fairness.6
59

SeeAndretta, supra note 9, at 10 (stating that "[iln essence, the court has, as a

matter of policy, determined that any and all parties who could conceivably be related to a controversy must be joined, even if the legal theories to be applied to the
parties are markedly different.").
W See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 289, 662 A.2d at 513 (holding that the plaintiff's
legal malpractice claims against her attorney were barred under the entire contro-

versy doctrine).

See id.
See id. at 285, 662A.2d atSll.
See id. at 286, 662 A.2d at 511.
See id. at 286-87, 662 A.2d at 512. The firm was ultimately replaced midlitiation due to a conflict of interest See id.
See id. at 287, 662 A.2d at 512.
See Circk Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 288, 662 A.2d at 512.
7 See id. at 298, 662 A.2d at
513.
U See id.; see also Cammarere, supranote 9, at 40 (explaining that the entire con62

troversy doctrine requires the client to assert a malpractice claim against an attorney
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The Circle Chevrolet court then addressed several of the potential
problems that might arise from applying the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions. 0 First, the court concluded
that, because the attorney already had an ethical obligation to inform a client of a potential malpractice claim," applying the entire
controversy doctrine would not place an additional burden on the
attorney-client relationship." Second, the court answered the plaintff's concerns that requiring the attorney malpractice claim to be
joined in the underlying action would waive the attorney-client privi7
lege and thereby risk exposure of otherwise privileged information.
The court rejected this argument, concluding that several protections against this danger were already in place: (1) attorneys were
not permitted to reveal all confidences during the course of a malpractice action, but only those necessary to aid in their defense 74 and
even if the attorney is still representing the client in the underlying case).
69 See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 291, 294, 662 A.2d at
514, 515.
70 See id. at 291-95, 662 A.2d at 514-16.
71 See id. at 291-92, 662 A.2d at 514. The NewJersey Rules of Professional
Conduct provide that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the... lawyer's own interests, unless ...the client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the
client." N.J. Rmux OF PROFMSSIONAL CoNmucr Rule 1.7(b) (2). Further, Rule 1.4(b)
states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Id. at
Rule 1.4(b).
See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 291-92, 662 A.2d at 514 (interpreting the rules
of professional conduct as placing a mandatory duty on an attorney to immediately
notify a client when he or she makes a mistake, and to further explain that the client might have a right to sue the attorney with the assistance of new counsel); see
also On-line Seminar, Circle Chevrolet: Pitfalls in Legal Malpractice,N.J. L.J., July 1,
1996, at S-1, 3 (reflecting the argument of Christopher Carey, a New Jersey practitioner, that the obligation to inform a client about a mistake "isa duty imposed by
the RPCs and is not something new to the entire controversy doctrine.... [and]
should [not) take the bar by surprise.").
73 See Circle Chevrole 142 N.J. at 292, 662 A.2d at
514. Attorneys defending
themselves from a malpractice claim are permitted to reveal confidential information to establish a defense. See N.J. RuLzs OF PROFE.SIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(c) (2).
Rule 1.6(c) (2) states:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client or
to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary
action against the lawyer based upon the conduct in which the client
was involved.
Id. The NewJersey Rules of Evidence provide a similar right to attorneys. See NJ.
R. Evin. 504(2) (c) (stating that the lawyer-client privilege shall not extend "to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client, or
by the client to his lawyer.").
See N.J. RuLis OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6(c) (stating that lawyers can
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(2) the entire controversy doctrine only required notification of the
malpractice claim to the court, rather than actual litigation simultaneously with the underlying action.' Third, the court emphasized

that the trial judge had discretion to formulate a litigation plan that
would be fair to all parties involved, including a number of procedural tools designed to ensure fairness and efficiency.'6 Finally, the
Circle Chevrolet court stressed that the entire controversy doctrine did
not bar unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued claims."
Circle Chevrolet had tremendous implications on both attorneys
and their clients. First, it required an in-depth analysis of every case
to determine the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine.
Second, it obligated attorneys to explain to their clients the ramifications of every single action taken in a law suit so that the clients
could make informed decisions whether to sue their attorneys. "

only reveal confidential information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary." ).
SSee Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super 372, 382, 506 A.2d 29, 34
(App. Div. 1986)
(holding that the trial court had discretion to determine whether a claim arising
out of the same controversy should be joined in the action or reserved).
76 See Circle Chevrmlet 142 N.J. at 293, 662 A.2d at 515; see also Cammarere,
supra
note 9, at I (noting that the Circle Chevrolet majority claimed that the decision would
not lead to bad results given the trial judge's discretion in scheduling cases and his
or her ability to sever the malpractice suit from the underlying action if necessary).
See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 294, 662 A.2d at 515. In Grunwald v. Bronkesh
the supreme court concluded that legal malpractice claims will not begin to accrue
until the client suffers actual damage and discovers, or should have discovered
through the use of reasonable diligence, the facts essential to the malpractice claim.
See 131 N.J. 483, 493-94, 621 A.2d 459, 464 (1993). Thus, legal malpractice claims
fall within the special class of claims that are governed by the "discovery rule." See
id. at 493, 621 A.2d at 459. Accordingly, when a claim is unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued within the boundaries of the discovery rule, the entire controversy doctrine
will not operate to bar such a claim if it is not joined in the underlying action. See
Circle Chevrole, 142 N.J. at 294, 662 A.2d at 515; see also Russ Bleemer, New Standard
of Proofin Legal MalpracticeCases, N.J. LJ.,July 29, 1996, at 1.
A final adjudication, however, is not necessary in order for the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice claim to begin running. See Grunwad, 131 N.J. at 495,
621 A.2d at 465. Nonetheless, most attorneys are under the mistaken belief that a
legal malpractice claim does not begin to accrue until damages in the underlying
case are fixed. See Hilton L. Stein, Lawyers Beware! Court Extends the Entire Controtrsy
Doctrine: Legal Malpractice Claims Expected to Increase, N.J. LAw., Sept. 18, 1995, at 29,
30.
78 See Stein, supra note 77, at 29. After
Circle Chevrolet "every case now must require an in-depth analysis as to whether it is appropriate to file a legal malpractice
case to add an attorney as defendant." Id. (emphasizing that "[tihis is true regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction.").
19 See Cammarere, supra note 9, at 40 (declaring that "when a goof occurs, it is
the lawyer's duty to tell a client he has a malpractice claim and should file it right
away or it will forever be barred.").
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Ill. CRITICISM OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
At first blush, the entire controversy doctrine appears to serve
some very altruistic goals, including fairness and efficiency." Soon
after the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced its decision in
Circle Chevrolet, however, it became abundantly clear that the doctrine
did not achieve its stated goals.81 Although the supreme court's decision to expand the entire controversy doctrine to joinder of parties
in Cogdell was intended to promote noteworthy procedural goals, the
court's subsequent decision in Circle Chevrolet made it evident that
this doctrine was more of a hindrance than a benefit to New Jersey
litigants. At the least, the entire controversy doctrine should have
created an exception for legal malpractice claims.2
Circle Chevrolet sparked a vigorous uproar in the New Jersey bar
and triggered almost immediate efforts to have the entire controversy doctrine abolished completely or, in the alternative, to have an
exception carved out in the context of legal malpractice actions."

Further, NewJersey courts, as well as members of the bar, quickly realized that the doctrine was not effectuating its goals."

Dissenting

so See Circle Chetvlet, 142 N.J. at 289, 662 A.2d at 513.
,1 See The Year at a Glance, N.J. L.J., Dec. 25, 1995, at 15 (stating that in Circle
Chevrolet and its companion cases, the supreme court stiffened the party joinder
rules to such a great extent that the only logical course of action to follow was to
.sue early and sue everyone, including your own lawyer.").
SSeeFor the New Year, N.J. L.J.,Jan. 8, 1996, at 26 (urging the NewJersey Bar to
persuade the NewJersey Supreme Court that the entire controversy doctrine is not
meeting its stated goals and has in fact caused more problems than it is worth).
Several critics have argued that merely carving out an exception for legal malpractice actions is not enough and that the doctrine's application to mandatory party
joinder should be abandoned altogether. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
83 See Coleman, supra note 4, at 3 (describing the New
Jersey legal community's
hostile reaction to the court's expansion of the entire controversy doctrine); Ronald
B. Grayzel, Once More into the Black Hole: The Entire Controversy Doctrine Grows in Scope
and Complexity, N.J. L.J., Sept. 2, 1996, at S-4 (noting the frustration of trial lawyers
due to the complexity and confusion surrounding the entire controversy doctrine);
Bennett J. Wasserman, The Circle Chevrolet Fallout Continues, Problems the Supreme
Court Did Not Solve, N.J. L.J., July 28, 1997, at S-4 (stating that "[t] he publication of
Circle Chevrolet and its companion cases hit the practicing bar like a lighting bolt");
Cheryl Winokur, Let's Keep It in the Family: Divorce Bar Seeks to Limit Entire Controversy
Doctrine,N.J. L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at 1, 15 (arguing that "[like income taxes, the rule
established by Circle Chevrolet is viewed as a misery in which everyone should
share."). There have been "[flew, if any, issues [that] have galvanized the bar so
swiftly and forcefully into action." Coleman, supra note 4, at 3.
See Cammarere, supranote 9, at 1 (recognizing that Circle Chevrolet resulted in
.confusion among lawyers, inconsistent interpretations by trial judges, and preclusion of valid claims by clients due to mistakes by lawyers"); Coleman, supra note 4, at
40 (noting Allan R. Stein's comment that "[tihe purpose of the doctrine-to pre-

1308

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1292

justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court sharply criticized the
court's expansion of the entire controversy doctrine." In addition,
the New Jersey Supreme Court's Civil Practice Committee proposed
altogether elimination of the entire controversy rule."
A.

The Entire ControversyDoctrineDoes Not PromoteIts Stated Goals

The most obvious problem with the expansion of the entire
controversy doctrine was that it did not meet its stated goals. First,
application of the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions often did not promote fairness in the outcome of the
litigation. Rather, the result of applying the entire controversy doctrine often denied litigants the opportunity to bring valid claims.8
vent defendants from being dragged into a suit more than once-is valid... but an
absent defendant has never been sued, so 'why should he care about being sued
later rather than earlier?'"); Crayzel, supra note 6, at S-7 (concluding that "[t]he extension of the doctrine to legal malpractice actions in Circle Chevrolet has impaired a
lawyer's ability to make judgment decisions and casts a cloud over attorney/client
relationships."); Editorial, Time to Reconsider Circle Chevrolet, N.J. LAw., Nov. 4,
1996, at 6 (declaring that Circle Chevrolet is not meeting its stated goals, including
judicial economy and efficiency, nor is it avoiding waste or delay).
For a more general description of the problems resulting from Circle Chevrolet,
see Wasserman, supra note 83, at S-4. Wasserman states what he believes to be the
four problems arising from the Circle Chevrolet holding: (1) it "drove a wedge" in
the attorney-client relationship; (2) it penalized an innocent client for failing to
join the attorney as a defendant, even when the lawyer's mistake might not ultimately constitute malpractice; (3) it forced a client to make the impossible choice
between discharging and suing his lawyer or forever losing the chance to bring a
subsequent malpractice action against the attorney; and (4) it jeopardized the clients' underlying case because confidential information revealed to the attorney in
preparation for the underlying matter could be used against the client in the malpractice action. See id.
See Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336,
348-55, 662 A.2d 536, 542-46 (Pollock,J., dissenting). Justice Pollock noted that the
majority's application of the entire controversy doctrine was not consistent with the
concepts ofjudicial fairness and economy that underlie the doctrine. See id. at 353,
662 A.2d at 545 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice criticized the majority for losing sight of judicial efficiency and equity. See id. For a general discussion of the
holding in Mortggelinq,see Jonathan Neal Marcus, Case Survey, 26 SETONML L.
REv. 485, 489 (1995).
See Mortgagelinq, 142 N.J. at 351, 662 A.2d at 543-44 (Pollock, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Civil Practice Committee acknowledged that, although theoretically the entire controversy doctrine had some appeal, in practice it had created
more problems than it solved); see also Rocco Cammarere, Entire Controversy: Pushfor
Change,N.J. LAW., Nov. 26, 1996, at 1 (stating that an ad hoc committee of the state
bar association is considering the practical impacts of the doctrine); Carboni, supra
note 8, at 1275 (noting the Civil Practice Committee's proposed reevaluation of the
doctrine).
See Bleemer, supra note 58, at 20 (arguing that the dismissal of claims pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine will prevent a decision on the merits). For
example, when a case is settled, but the litigation was instituted against only some of
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Furthermore, parties joined in the original suit often suffered the
consequences and hardships of admitting newly discovered parties
while in the midst of litigation.
After Circle Chevrol4 asserting a
malpractice action might result in the client having to obtain a new
attorney despite that the underlying litigation with the original attorney was still ongoing." The doctrine often forced parties to make
the impossible choice of forfeiting the right to a cause of action or
unnecessarily delaying and complicating the ongoing matter by the
addition of new claims and parties.' As a result, the doctrine generated procedural unfairness by destroying a party's ability to make
strategic decisions concerning joinder.9 ' These results clearly conflicted with the doctrine's goal of promoting procedural fairness for
all litigation parties.9
In addition to failing to promote procedural fairness, the entire
controversy doctrine did not result in judicial economy. First, the
entire controversy doctrine required litigants to assert claims against
their attorneys that might not otherwise have been asserted.'" Secseveral potential defendants, a second suit against different defendants will be
barred despite the fact that the first case was settled. See Andretta, supra note 9, at
10. The result is justified because allowing the second suit to proceed would deprive the courts of the efficiency of having the matter concluded in one single proceeding. See id. By mandating such a result, however, the doctrine acts to bar parties from actually litigating their claim on the merits. See id.
See Cammarere, supra note 86, at 6 (arguing that requiring the belated joinder of additional parties with potentially material interests in the outcome of the
lawsuit imposes a significant burden on the original parties because matters such as
pleadings and discovery become far more complicated and often take longer to
conclude).
9 ee Cynthia M. Jacob, The Entire Controversy Doctrine and Attorney Malpractice:
A
Study in Failure,NJ. LAw., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 5 (referring to the President of the
New Jersey Bar Association's statement questioning whether the entire controversy
doctrine serves the client's interest when it forces the client to hire an independent
attorney to handle the malpractice claim while the underlying litigation is occurSee Robert R. Cordell,Joinder Rule in DivorceSuits Disastrous,NJ. LAw., Nov. 18,
1996, at 7 (discussing the impossible position in which the entire controversy doctrine places parties in a divorce).
91 See generally Hazard, supra note 20, at 54-58 (explaining the various strategic
decisions that can arise when determining which parties to join in the initial litigation). Determining which parties and claims to join is often a tactical decision to
which parties give great weight in determining litigation strategy. See id. The entire
controversy doctrine, by forcing a party to join each and every potential party in the
first action or forfeit the right to later sue absent parties, removes such tactical decisions from litigants. See id.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of the entire
controversy doctrine).
9
See On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-10 (reflecting Seton Hall Law School
Professor Howard Erichson's comment that normally a client who is made aware of
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ond, interfering with a party's strategic reasons for failing to join a
party in the original action might result in more complicated and
less effectively managed cases.9 This is especially true when the
claims asserted are very different because the court is then forced to
deal with twice as many issues and attorneys.95 Thus, the holding in
Circle Chevrolet resulted not in judicial economy, the goal of the entire controversy doctrine, but in converting simple cases into complex litigation.94
B. Damageto Attorney-Client Relationships
The significant burden on the attorney-client relationship was
an additional problem that emerged from Circle Chevrolet. The Circle
Chevrolet court reasoned that expanding the doctrine to legal malpractice claims would not damage the attorney-client relationship
because attorneys were already ethically obliged to advise their clients of potential malpractice claims.7 It soon became evident, howa potential malpractice claim by his attorney will "allow the lawsuit to proceed
against the initial adversary or adversaries, on the significant chance that the lawyer's error will ultimately prove harmless or largely harmless and that therefore no

malpractice claim will be asserted."). Accordingly, the practical effect of the entire
controversy doctrine is that parties are being forced to join additional parties whom
might not otherwise have beenjoined. See id. This "complicates and delays the underlying litigation by adding layers of unnecessary complexity to discovery and
other pretrial proceedings." Id.
See Editorial, Efficiency andJustice, NJ. LJ., July 28, 1997, at 26 (arguing that
plaintiffs often have legitimate strategic reasons for omitting parties from the first
action and that, by precluding plaintiffs from making such decisions, the entire
controversy doctrine creates a risk that cases will be managed less effectively).
95 See id. (proposing that when two litigations have almost no shared elements, it
is possible that a complex, multi-party, multi-claim action will absorb a significantly
greater amount of energy and resources); see abso Editorial, An Unfortunate One-Two
Punch, N.J. LJ., Feb. 15, 1990, at 6 (arguing that "[t]he requirement that all parties
join all other persons having a potentially material interest in the litigation threatens vast overcomplication of the scope of litigation."); Forswearingthe Merits, supra
note 12, at 24 (recognizing that since the expansion of the entire controversy doctrine, plaintiffs have faced increasing costs for litigation due to the fact that an action must involve multiple parties and claims).
See Tirae to Reconsider Circle Chevrolet, supranote 84, at 6. In essence, the supreme court's expansion of the entire controversy doctrine sent a message to attorneys to "sue everybody." See Bleemer, supra note 58, at 21 (emphasizing that attorneys will have to "examine the litigation, and if there is any, any, any possibility that
there is somebody who can be involved in this, you have to bring them into the lawsuit."); Ronald B. Grayzel, Setting Higher Hurdles: Trial Lawyers Meeting StricterProcedures and Tougher Sanctions,N.J. L.J., Sept. 4, 1995, at S-4, S-19 (arguing that the entire controversy doctrine has grown out of control because it will spark attorneys to
adopt defensive strategies and sue every possible party on every possible claim).
See Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 292,
662 A.2d 509, 514 (1989) (declaring that the entire controversy doctrine does not
violate the lawyer-client relationship because the attorney already has an ethical
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ever, that the court underestimated the wedge that would be driven
between an attorney and his client following the expansion of the
entire controversy doctrine."
The application of the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice actions had a negative impact on the attorney-client relationship for several reasons. First, the doctrine forced the client to
make the nearly impossible choice between discharging and then suing his attorney, or forever relinquishing the right to bring a legal
malpractice action." Second, applying the doctrine to attorney malpractice actions resulted in the innocent client losing the right to sue
his attorney despite that the attorney's mistake might not have initially qualified as malpractice.'"° Finally, the doctrine created the
danger that confidential attorney-client communications would be
revealed during the course of the underlying litigation.' 1
By forcing a client to make the difficult choice between suing
the attorney or losing his or her right to pursue later a malpractice
action, the entire controversy doctrine often resulted in the inevitable destruction of long-standing attorney-client relationships. " Cirdut%to disclose any potential malpractice claims to the client).
See Cammarere, supra note 86, at 14 (quoting Alan S. Gould, NewJersey practitioner, as stating that "[s]topping in the middle of a case to tell a client to hire a
new lawyer and file a malpractice lawsuit does not breed good faith and a good
working relationship."); Tim O'Brien, GoingAround in Circle, NJ. L.J.,Jan. 8, 1996,
at 1 (declaring that Circle Chevroletis harming the attorney-client relationship).
See Wasserman, supranote 83, at S-4. For a good hypothetical demonstrating
how the entire controversy doctrine forces the client to prematurely sue his attorney
before waiting until the conclusion of the underlying suit to determine whether the
malpractice resulted in a loss, see Editorial, Circling the Wagons in Circle Chevrolet,
NJ. Law., Sept. 4, 1995, at 6; see also On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-10
(reflecting the argument of Professor Howard Erichson that "the entire controversy
doctrine undermine[s] a valued fiduciary relationship.... [ulnless a client is willing to waive potential malpractice claims, the client will be forced to sever an otherwise valued relationship and go to the expense and trouble of hiring new counsel.").
10 See Wasserman, supranote 83, at S-4.
101 See id.
102

See On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-10. Professor Howard Erichson of Se-

ton Hall University School of Law succinctly described the strain placed on the attorney-client relationship by the entire controversy doctrine. See id. Erichson proposed that, although the attorney is under an ethical obligation to report any
potential malpractice to his or her client, the client might still make the decision to
retain the attorney for the underlying litigation. See id. As Professor Erichson explained, there are several reasons why continued representation might be desirable:
(1) it might preserve a long standing relationship between the lawyer and the client; (2) retaining the attorney is more efficient, given the fact that the attorney who
has represented the client since the beginning of the lawsuit undoubtedly possesses
the most knowledge about the litigation; and (3) continued representation provides
the lawyer with the opportunity to correct any malpractice by receiving a favorable
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cle Chevrolet made such a result inevitable by forcing a client to join
the malpractice claim even if the attorney was still representing the
client in the underlying action." This legal predicament created a
contradiction in logic because requiring the attorney to protect his
or her own interests as well as those of the client was often implausible, if not impossible.' 4
Another major criticism of Circle Chevrolet centered on the danger its application posed to confidential attorney-client communications. The danger stemmed from the ethical rule that allows a defendant attorney to divulge any confidential communication
necessary to aid in his defense of a malpractice claim.'" Thus, when
a client joins a malpractice action with the underlying action, confidential information that might hurt the client's underlying case can
be divulged by the attorney in his defense.' 6 While the New Jersey
judgment. See id. Professor Erichson pointed out, however, that the entire controversy doctrine takes this decision from the client, forcing the client to join the potential malpractice claim or lose the chance to bring such a claim in a subsequent
action. See id. Essentially, it precludes the client from having both opportunities"keep the lawyer for the litigation to cure the underlying problem, AND preserve
the malpractice claim in case the underlying action fails to cure the problem." Id.
(questioning why the client should be forced to make that choice).
Under the logic of Circle Chevrolet, it is irrelevant that a client had a longstanding relationship with his attorney or that the client was actually satisfied with
the attorney's handling of the underlying case. See 142 N.J. at 292, 662 A.2d at 514.
If there was even the slightest possibility that the attorney was negligent in some
manner or made even the smallest mistake, the client was forced to join him as a
party before learning whether the mistake had any result whatsoever on the outcome. See id. Thus, the client was forced to create premature turmoil by firing his
lawyer and hiring a new lawyer mid-litigation. See Forswearingthe Merits, supra note
12, at 24.
los See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 292-93, 662 A.2d at 514-15; see also Daniel M.
Serviss, Case Survey, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 498, 50-04 (stating that the Circle Chevrolet decision created "an environment where the attorney stands before the judge
or jury, representing the interests of the client while at the same time being compelled to protect his or her own interests.").
See Serviss, supra note 103, at 503; see also Circling the Wagons in Circle Chevrolet, supra note 99, at 6 (arguing that the doctrine is devastating to the judicial process because the lawyer must defend himself against a malpractice claim while at the
same time trying to achieve a favorable result for the client.
105 See N.J. RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6.
:06 See On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-6 (reproducing
comments by Glenn
Bergenfield, a solo practitioner in New Jersey). Bergenfield argues that lawyers
need to warn their clients: "Everything you tell me is confidential unless I screw up
your case and force you to sue me. Then I will tell your adversary every private
thought you have ever entrusted me with." Id. Bergenfield suggested that an attorney can, in essence, blackmail the client to refrain from suing the lawyer by threatening the client with divulgence of confidential information should the client sue
him. See id.
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Supreme Court opined that this danger'could be curtailed,'07 the inadequacies of any protection did little to safeguard attorney-client

confidences.'08
C. Excess Litigation

Applying the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice actions also fostered excessive and often unnecessary litigation. The
problems created by the doctrine in this respect were twofold. First,

clients brought malpractice actions against their attorneys that may
not have been brought otherwise." Second, an additional round of
litigation was triggered to enforce the doctrine." ° Thus, Circle Chevrolet spurred an increase in motions, cases, and claims out of fear that
failure to take such action would result in their preclusion."'
With regard to the first problem, the Circle Chevrolet holding re-

quired clients to bring suits against their attorneys for any potential
claim, including minor errors, despite that such errors might never

have resulted in malpractice.1"2 A mistake by an attorney oftentimes
will not result in a malpractice suit because the attorney is able to
correct the error and the underlying suit results in the client's fa-

1o See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 292-93, 662 A.2d at 514-15. The
Circle Chevrolet

majority argued that the danger that confidential information will be exposed is
prevented by two safeguards: (1) the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prevent
an attorney from divulging unnecessary information, and (2) by the fact that the
trial court has the discretion to sever the action if necessary to protect client confidences. See id.
108 See On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-6 (reflecting the criticism of Bergenfield, a solo practitioner in NewJersey, to the supreme court's proposed solution to
the problem of exposure of confidential information). In response to the Circle
Cheuroletcourt's conclusion that the trial judge's power to sever a malpractice action
will protect attorney-client confidences, critics have responded that "the attorneyclient relationship is too important to the administration ofjustice to allow different
judges all over the state to come to different conclusions on whether that relationship is more important in a given set of circumstances than litigating all claims
against parties in one courtroom at one time." Id.
See On-line Seminar, supra note 72, at S-7 (reproducing criticisms of the Entire Controversy Doctrine by Andrew Rubin, a NewJersey solo practitioner).
It See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 NJ. 424, 464, 696 A.2d 633, 654 (1997) (Stein, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I See Russ Bleemer, Decsions Spark Fear of Naked" Lawyers, NJ. L.J. Mar. 25,
1996, at 3 (declaring that the application of the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions increased litigation out of fear that if the claims were not
brought they would be precluded).
1
Se Tite to Reconsider Circle Chevrolet, supra note 84, at 6 (stating that after
Circle Chevrolet clients were forced to immediately join prior counsel in the underlying action even if there was only a remote possibility of legal malpractice).
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vor."5 Applying the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions, however, obliterated the client's opportunity to await the
results of the underlying suits before determining whether to sue his
attorney.14 The doctrine thereby shortened the client's time to determine whether he had suffered any damages from malpractice." 5
Accordingly, Circle Chevrolet had a counterintuitive effect because it
generated litigation of claims that may have never been brought. "6
The second manner in which Circle Chevrolet created excess litigation was by creating, in essence, a second round of litigation
strictly concerning the interpretation of the entire controversy doctrine."' After Circle Chevrolet, excess motions were filed to have cases
dismissed pursuant to the doctrine."' The implications were clear:.
motions had to be filed and claims brought in order to determine

1 See id. (discussing how attorneys often avoid the costs, stress, and pressure of a
malpractice suit by obtaining a favorable judgment for their clients in the underlying litigation); see also Cammarere, supra note 86, at 14 (stating that "[a] lot of
times... a legal malpractice action is not necessary because by the time the case is
completed and a settlement or verdict has been reached, any errors or mistakes by
the attorney usually have been fixed.").
, See Cammarere, supranote 86, at 14; see also On-line Seminar, supranote 72, at
S-7 (reflecting Andrew Rubin's argument that although "[l]awyers make mistakes
all the time.... [miost mistakes are overcome or are resolved during the course of
an action."). The entire controversy doctrine, however, places "an affirmative burden on a lawyer to announce his mistakes without allowing him the opportunity to
cure.... [this] create[s] andprolong[s] litigation." Id. (emphasis added).
11
See Cammarere, supra note 86, at 14 (arguing that application of the entire
controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions "drastically shorten[ed] a client's time to decide whether to sue for malpractice.*).
116 See Coleman, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting Allan R. Stein, Professor of Law at
Rutgers School of Law at Camden, as stating that "[t]he doctrine itself generates
inefficiencies.... [by forcing] the assertion of claims that might not otherwise be
brought."). In Prevatrilv. MohrJustice Stein recognized the fact that the entire controversy doctrine might create a "race to the courthouse." See 145 N.J. 180, 201-02,
678 A-2d 243, 25-54 (1996) (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The justice opined that the entire controversy doctrine did not meet its stated goals
of clearing backlog, but, in fact, may have had the opposite effect, causing a flurry
of litigation. See i&
117 See Grayzel, supra note 83, at S-7 (proposing that interpretation of the doctrine has become a "cottage industry" due to the large amount of motions and appellate decisions addressing the entire controversy doctrine).
1 See Bleemer, supranote 58, at 20 (stating that the entire controversy doctrine
does not promote judicial economy but is in fact encouraging more short term litigation because defense attorneys are bringing more motions to get cases dismissed
pursuant to the doctrine); see also Cammarere, supra note 9, at 1 (citing reports by a
legal malpractice attorney that at least 50% of the motions filed in legal malpractice
cases at his office ask ajudge to determine the application of the entire controversy
doctrine).
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whether the doctrine applied because failure to act promptly might
result in preclusion of the claim altogether.
Finally, applying the doctrine to attorney malpractice actions
opened a virtual "Pandora's Box.""" Circle Chevrolet created a vicious
circle: if an attorney failed to join any claim his client may have
against a prior attorney, the subsequent attorney might also be liable
under a legal malpractice theory." The client would then be forced
to assert a malpractice claim against the subsequent attorney for failing to assert the client's malpractice claim against the prior attorney.
Stemming from this scenario is the legal anomaly in which lawyers
are suing lawyers for failing to sue other lawyers.'
D. A Rule Unique to New Jersey
As evidence of the entire controversy doctrine's impracticality,
no other jurisdiction in the United States, with the possible exception of Kansas," has a remotely similar preclusive joinder rule.'" AlSee Andretta, supranote 9, at 36. The Pandora's Box can be illustrated as follows: if the newly hired attorney delays too long in joining the previous attorney in
the underlying action pursuant to Circe Cherolt, then the new attorney might be
subject to suit for his or her negligence in failing to join the previous attorney. See
id. The new attorney will then also have to be joined in the underlying action pursuant to the entire controversy doctrine. See id.
M See Stein, supra note 77, at 29 (stating that lawyers mustjoin all of the client's
potential malpractice claims in the underlying litigation to avoid preclusion of
those claims because failure to do so will result in that lawyer being guilty of malpractice).
121 See Henry Gottlieb, Circle Chevrolet Recalled, But Don't Expect a Refund,
N.J.
LJ., July 21, 1997, at 1 (pointing out that "[tihe [Circle Chevrolet] decision also
threatened to start a niche market: lawyers who sue lawyers for not suing lawyers.*).
In See Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1130
(Kan. 1981). In Albertsn, the Kansas Supreme Court created its "one action" rule.
See id. The plaintiff in Albertfon, a victim of a car accident, sued the driver of the
other car, and the jury determined that the plaintiff was 40% at fault for the accident and the defendant was 60% at fault. See id. at 1128. Subsequently, the plaintiff
filed an action against Volkswagenwerk alleging that the car was defective. See id,
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the second action was barred by a finding of
comparative fault in the first trial. See id. at 1132. The Albertson court reasoned that
since the court in the first action had apportioned all possible fault, there was no
fault remaining to be placed on the defendant in the subsequent action. See iti
The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the Kansas Comparative Fault Act as barring successive actions regarding the same controversy. See id. at 1129-30. This rule
became known as the "one action rule." See Hickman, supra note 51, at 758
(providing a detailed analysis of Kansas's one action rule).
"2 Se Wasserman, supra note 83, at S-4 (noting that "New Jersey became infamously unique in that no other state had adopted as draconian a rule as the entire
controversy doctrine and applied it to legal malpractice claims."); see also Allan RL
Stein, Commentay: Power, Duty and the Entire Contmversy Doactne, 28 RtrrGzls LJ. 27,
30 (1996) (describing the uniqueness of NewJersey's entire controversy doctrine).
1
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though other jurisdictions do have party joinder rules, New Jersey's
rule is far broader than the rules that govern partyjoinder in other
jurisdictions. 2 Most notably, the federal joinder provisions are significantly different.'2
124

See generally Coleman, supra note 4, at 40 (recognizing Allan R. Stein's com-

ment "NewJersey has the broadestjoinder rule in the nation because it precludes
joinder against parties not named in the first suit.") (emphasis added).
2
See Fa. R. Civ. P. 18(a); id. at R. 19; id. at R. 20; id. at R. 21. Rule 18(a),
which governsjoinder of claims and remedies, provides:
(a) Joinder of Claims. A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, may join, either
as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable,
or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.
Id. at R. 18(a). Rule 19 states the federal rule with regard tojoinder of parties:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whosejoinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in
the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined,
the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made
a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. Ifthe
joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render
the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from
the action.
(b) Determination by Court WheneverJoinder not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a
party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided;
third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy
if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Id. at R. 19. Rule 20 provides for permissive joinder of parties and states, in relevant
part:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons...
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
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While the federal system contains rules providing for permissive
and compulsory joinder of certain claims, none of these rules have
the preclusive effect of New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine.'"
Failure to join a party in a federal action will not necessarily preclude
that party from being sued in subsequent litigation.'" It follows then
that a plaintiff has more leeway to decide strategically which defendants to join in the action.'" Thus, the entire controversy doctrine is
a rule unique to NewJersey.'

them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common
to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party, and may order separate trials or make
other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
Id. at R. 20. Finally, Rule 21 provides the consequences for misjoinder of parties:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Id. atR. 21.
'in See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (governing compulsory
counterclaims); id. at R.
13(b) (addressing permissive counterclaims); id. at R. 13(g) (stating procedure for
permissive cross-claims).
17 See idi at R. 19(a). Although Rule 19(a) requires certain defendants
to be
joined "if feasible," it does not require joinder unless failure to do so would prevent
complete relief or the absent party has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation and his absence will prejudice his ability to protect his interest. See id.
n See id. at R. 20(a); see also Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Tide
Ins. Co., 142 NJ. 310, 350, 662 A.2d 536, 544 (1995) (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice Pollock recognized that the joinder rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were less restrictive than NewJersey's rules and gave parties more discretion
in determining trial strategies. See id. To illustrate the importance of giving a plaintiff discretion as to joinder, the justice referred to federal diversity actions. See id.
Justice Pollock explained that in order to preserve complete diversity, plaintiffs are
not forced to join all potential defendants. See id Under the federal rules, electing
to sue only certain defendants in such a manner will not preclude a subsequent action against the unnamed parties. See id.
'" See Mortgagelinq, 142 NJ. at 350, 662 A.2d at 543 (Pollock, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that NewJersey's rules regarding claim preclusion are unique).
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Confusion Among Lower Courts

As illustrated through conflicting lower court decisions since
1995, the problems associated with Circle Chevrolet created confusion
and uncertainty among the lower courts in New Jersey, with some
courts using the entire controversy doctrine as a means of preclusion
5and others refusing to apply it. ' " For example, in Pery v. T0id
the appellate division held that the entire controversy doctrine was
not applicable to the probate court.' 2 In Fischer v. Heck,"" the superior court held that a special civil part action did not bar a subse-

quent law division action under the entire controversy doctrine.'" In
contrast, however, the chancery division in Mustilli v. Mustilh4 - held
that a legal malpractice claim must be joined with a marital claim,
despite that matrimonial claims are equitable and are tried without a
jury.'" This lack of uniform application of the doctrine resulted in a
confused and frustrated New Jersey bar.'
Despite this confusion,
lawyers were convinced that the court's holdings in Circle Chevrolet
and its progeny evidenced a firm commitment to the doctrine."

130

See Cammarere, supra note 86, at 14 (discussing the conflicting interpreta-

tions of the entire controversy doctrine in the appellate courts). Critics have argued
that perhaps the entire controversy doctrine seemed sensible to the NewJersey Supreme Court because, as the state's highest court, the supreme court only sees the
procedural problems of the lower courts on an ex post basis. See Hazard, supra note
20, at 36. This reasoning might explain why, despite the New Jersey Supreme
Court's view of the entire controversy doctrine, the doctrine remained unintelligible to both lower courts and attorneys. See id.
1
288 NJ. Super. 223, 672 A.2d 213 (App. Div. 1996).
1
See id. at 229, 672 A.2d at 215-16. The Perry court based its holding on the fact
that the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. See id.
Iss290 N.J. Super. 162, 675 A.2d 254 (Law Div. 1996).
13
See id. at 174-75, 675 A.2d at 259-60. Like the court in Perry, the appellate division in Fischerbased its holding on the fact that the special civil division is a court
of limitedjurisdiction. See id.
:" 287 NJ. Super. 605, 287 A.2d 650 (Ch. Div. 1995).
13 See id. at 620, 287 A.2d at 657.
IS7 Se Cammarere, supra note 9, at 1 (noting the
comment by Hilton L. Stein, a
NewJersey legal malpractice attorney, that the problem with the entire controversy
doctrine is the lack of uniform application); Gottlieb, supra note 11, at 3 (describing
conflicting interpretations of the entire controversy doctrine that are confusing lawyers as to its application in legal malpractice actions).
Is See Carboni, supra note 8, at 1277 (describing the NewJersey Supreme Court's
overwhelming support of the entire controversy doctrine).
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M. THE SUPREME COURT OVERRULES CIRCLE CHEVROLETAND CARVES

OUT AN EXCEPTION TO THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE FOR
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE ACTIONS.

Perhaps based on the tremendous amount of pressure placed
on the Supreme Court of NewJersey by the state's bar following Circle Chevrole4 or perhaps because the court realized that the decision
was not serving its intended objectives, the court overruled Circle
Chevrolet in 19972" In Olds v. Donnelly,"* one of three 1997 NewJersey Supreme Court decisions addressing the entire controversy doctrine, the court held that the doctrine no longer applied in the context of attorney malpractice actions.'4'
In OWds, the plaintiff, Olds, hired Donnelly to represent him in a
medical malpractice suit.4 Eventually, Donnelly terminated his representation of Olds and the trial court dismissed the medical malpractice suit with prejudice for failure to serve timely the defendant
doctor.'43 Olds subsequently brought suit against Donnelly, alleging
that Donnelly was negligent in failing to effect timely service in the
underlying action.'" Donnelly brought a motion for summary judg139 See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 428, 696 A.2d 633, 636 (1997); Karpovich
v. Barbarula, 150 N.J. 473, 476, 696 A.2d 659, 660 (1997); Donohue v. Kuhn, 150
NJ. 484, 488, 696 A.2d 664, 666 (1997). For a general description of the Olds decision, see Lydia Barbara Bashwiner, The DocMne's Party-JoinderRequirements Do Not Extend to Legal-Malpractice Claims, N.J. LAw., July 21, 1997, at 26 and Michael A. Riccardi, N.J. Ends Exriment with Legal Malpractice Complaints, THE LEGAL
INTELuGENcz,July 21, 1997, at 1.
150 N.J. 424, 696 A.2d 633 (1997).
See id. at 428, 696 A.2d at 636. The two companion cases to Olds reached similar holdings. In Karpouich, the supreme court held:
The settlement of the underlying action did not sufficiently involve
the use ofjudicial resources to invoke the entire controversy doctrine
as a bar to th[eJ legal malpractice action.... [T]he entire controversy doctrine does not compel either notice to the trial court of the
possible legal-malpractice claim or the joinder of the attorney in the
underlying action that gives rise to that claim.
150 NJ. at 476, 696 A.2d at 660. The Karpovich court found that the settlement of
the underlying claim did not provide the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to
litigate the legal malpractice claim, and, furthermore, that precluding the plaintiff's
claim under the entire controversy doctrine would run counter to the doctrine's
goal of fairness. See id. at 481, 696 A.2d at 663. The supreme court further held
that applying the doctrine in this case would "undermine the public policy favoring
settlements." Id. at 482, 696 A.2d at 663. Similarly, in Donohue, the supreme court
held that the plaintiffs' legal malpractice claims were not barred under the entire
controversy doctrine for failing to join the claims with the underlying wrongful
death and survivorship actions. See 150 NJ. at 488, 696 A.2d at 666.
1
See Olds, 150 NJ. at 428, 696 A.2d at 636.
1
See id. at 429, 696 A.2d at 636.
" See id. at 430, 696 A.2d at 636.
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ment, arguing that Olds's claim should be dismissed pursuant to the
45 The trial court denied this motion.'40
entire controversy doctrine.
The jury then returned a verdict for $500,000, but the trial court
granted Donnelly's motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) . ' The appellate division reversed the JNOV, reinstated the
judgment for Olds, and further concluded that Olds's claims against
Donnelly were not barred under the entire controversy doctrine.'*
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the appellate division, holding that the entire controversy doctrine did not bar Olds's
legal malpractice claim against Donnelly.'40 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Pollock, declared that the entire controversy doctrine would no longer apply in the context of attorney-malpractice
actions."" The court agreed with the appellate division's conclusion
that the entire controversy doctrine did not apply to Olds's legal
malpractice claim because Olds did not sustain any actual damage
until the trial court dismissed the underlying medical malpractice
suit. "' Thus, the court concluded that the legal malpractice action
did not accrue until that time. "2 In addition to these findings, the
court took notice of the criticism directed toward applying the entire
controversy doctrine to legal malpractice actions.'5

See id., 696 A.2d at 637.
See id.
141 See id. In Olds, Donnelly argued that Olds' malpractice claim was barred under the entire controversy doctrine because it was not asserted in the underlying
medical-malpractice action. See id.
14
See Olds v. Donnelly, 291 NJ. Super. 222, 227, 232, 677 A.2d 238, 240, 243
(App. Div. 1996) (holding that Olds' legal malpractice action against Donnelly was
not precluded pursuant to Circk Chevrokt because the claim did not accrue until the
medical-malpractice action had been dismissed).
149 See Olds, 150 NJ. at 428, 696
A.2d at 635-36.
"5 See id.
1 See id. at 489, 696 A.2d at 641.
I
See id. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court reiterated its prior
holding in Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 NJ. 483, 621 A.2d 459 (1993), that the discovery rule applies to the accrual of statute of limitations in attorney-malpractice actions. See Olds, 150 NJ. at 439, 696 A.2d at 641. The court then reasoned that under Grunwald the limitations period on Olds' claim against Donnelly did not begin
to run until the underlying claim was dismissed with prejudice. See id. at 438-39,
696 A.2d at 640-41. The Olds court found that "mere knowledge of an attorney's
negligence does not cause a legal malpractice claim to accrue. The client must sustain actual damage." Id. at 437, 696 A.2d at 640. Accordingly, the Olds court affirmed the appellate division's holding that Olds' claim against Donnelly did not
accrue until the medical-malpractice claim had been dismissed. See id. at 439, 696
A.2d at 641.
16 See Olds, 150 NJ. at 440, 443, 696 A.2d at 641, 643.
145

14

1998)

ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE

1321

The supreme court recognized several problems caused by its
prior decision in Circle Chevrolet." First, the Olds court recognized
the doctrine's potential to have a chilling effect on the attorneyclient relationship." Second, the court acknowledged that applying
the doctrine to legal malpractice actions could jeopardize attorneyclient confidences.'"
Despite recognition of these significant problems, the O/ds majority declined to overrule Cogdell v. Hospital Cente9 5 ' and altogether
abolish mandatory party joinder." Instead, the court limited its decision by providing an exception to the entire controversy doctrine
for attorney malpractice actions.'" Further, the Olds court reserved
consideration as to whether the entire controversy doctrine should
be abandoned altogether until its biennial review of the rules of
practice.'" In reaching this conclusion, the Ods court emphasized
that the preclusive effect of the entire controversy doctrine should
be used only as a tool of last resort.'
Finally, the supreme court
I" See id. at 440-43, 696 A.2d at 641-43. The problems recognized by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Olds reflect the criticisms articulated by NewJersey lawyers
following the Circle Chevrolet decision. See Grayzel, supra note 6, at S-6.
1 See Olds, 150 NJ. at 440-41, 696 A.2d at 641-42. The supreme court acknowledged that applying the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice actions
chills the attorney-client relationship in many ways including: forcing the client to
spend time and money to hire a second attorney to pursue the legal malpractice
claim; separating the first attorney's interests from those of the client so that the
attorney will place his or her own interests above those of the client; and placing
clients in the position of firing an attorney with whom they may have had a longtime successful relationship or forever waiving their right to sue. See id. at 441, 696
A.2d at 642. Such results "do not provide the fairness the entire controversy doctrine is designed to encourage." Id.
M See id. at 441, 696 A.2d at 642. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
that when attorneys are sued for legal malpractice, information that was previously
privileged becomes discoverable and may be disclosed to aid in the attorney's defense. See id.; see a/o notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of Circle Chevrolet on attorney-client communications). The Circle Chevrolet
court had concluded, however, that the risk disclosing confidential communications
could be minimized by protections in the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
discretion of the trial judge. See Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla,
142 NJ. 280, 292, 662 A.2d 509, 514 (1995). The Olds court dismissed this reasoning, holding that "on further consideration, however, we believe that the risk of disclosure of privileged information and the generally adverse effects on attorneyclient relationships outweighs any benefit from requiring a client to assert a malpractice claim in the pending lawsuit." Olds, 150 N.J. at 441-42, 696 A.2d at 642.
157 116 NJ. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989).
f See Olds, 150 NJ. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644-45.
15 See id. at 446, 449, 696 A.2d at 644, 646.
O See id.
1 Se id. at 446-47, 696 A.2d at 645; see aLso Gelber v. Zito Partnership, 147 NJ.
561, 565-66, 688 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1997) (describing measures that the trial court
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concluded that the decision should be applied on a limited retroactive basis to all pending claims.162 Pursuant to this finding, the court
then granted certification in a number of cases barred under the entire controversy doctrine, reversed the holdings, and remanded the
cases for a decision consistent with Ods.".
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Ods exemption of attorney malpractice actions from the
entire controversy doctrine will have many practical effects for New
Jersey lawyers. Clients can now wait to learn the results of the underlying action before determining whether or not to bring a malpractice action without fear of preclusion; thus, the number of malpractice actions will probably decrease.1 " Consequently, malpractice
insurance premiums will be lowered. Furthermore, although some
attorneys argue that excluding attorney malpractice actions from the
entire controversy doctrine deprives attorneys of an important defense when being sued, the decrease in the number of malpractice
suits will effectively counter the loss of this defense.'"
In addition to the practical changes that will result from exempting attorney malpractice actions from the reach of the entire
could have employed in place of the entire controversy doctrine to insure fairness
to all parties).
162 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 449-50, 696 A.2d at 646. Many individuals have
criticized
the Olds court's decision to apply its holding retroactively only to those cases pending on appeal or still in the trial court, while ignoring those cases that were dismissed under Circle Chevrole. See Wasserman, supra note 88, at S-5 (arguing that
plaintiffs who feel their cases were unjustly dismissed under Circle Chevrolet should
bejpermitted to reinstate their case and have it decided).
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Dollinger, 151 N.J. 68, 68, 697 A.2d 542, 542 (1997);
Goralczyk v. Olesnycky, 151 NJ. 68, 68, 697 A.2d 542, 542 (1997);Jablonski v. Robinson, Wayne, Levin, Riccio & LaSala, 151 N.J. 68, 68, 697 A.2d 542, 542 (1997);
Wills v. C. Morrison, 151 N.J. 69, 69, 697 A.2d 543, 548 (1997); Bailey v. Pcaro &
Pocaro, 151 NJ. 69, 69, 697 A.2d 543, 548 (1997); Carlin v. Cornell, Hegarty &
Koch, 151 N.J. 69, 69, 697 A.2d 543, 543 (1997); T&M Realty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 151
N. 70, 70, 697 A.2d 543, 543 (1997).
See Rocco Cammarere, Entire ControversyDoctrine: High Court Backs Down: Justices Cow Full Circle, NJ. LAw.,July 21, 1997, at 1.
16 See id. (arguing that one benefit of Olds will be lower malpractice
insurance
premiums).
166 See id. (arguing that the loss of any potential advantages attorneys
received
under the entire controversy doctrine will be offset by a decrease in the number of
legal malpractice suits). Despite the overwhelmingly positive implications of the
Olds decision, there are still those lawyers, particularly malpractice defense attorneys
and attorneys who had a malpractice suit against them dismissed pursuant to Circ/l
Cherolet, who are disappointed by the supreme court's decision. See Henry Gottlieb,
Orphans of a Dead Doctrine: What's Next for Legal Malpractice Claims Affected by Circle
Chevrolet's Demise?, N.J. LJ., Aug. 4, 1997, at 1.
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controversy doctrine, the future implications of Olds may be far
broader. Namely, OWds may be a harbinger of the death of mandatory partyjoinder altogether in NewJersey. Although the supreme
court declined completely to overrule CogdeU in OW/s, the court was
very conscious of the tremendous criticism directed at mandatory
partyjoinder 1 " In fact, the Olds majority twice noted that consideration as to whether the entire controversy doctrine should be abolished, modified, or changed would be made in its biennial review of
the proposed amendments to the NewJersey Rules of Practice.' In
addition, the Olds court warned that, even in cases not involving legal
S Cammarere, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that Olds may be foreshadowing
the death of the entire controversy doctrine).
M See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 444-45, 696 A.2d 655, 644 (1997). The
court noted the following criticisms of Cog/elt (1) "mandatory party joinder is
counterproductive"; (2) the entire controversy doctrine "generates uncertainty and
is too difficult for lawyers and judges to understand; (3) the "doctrine impairs
valuable relationships by requiring the assertion of claims against parties one otherwise would not sue"; (4) "the preclusion of a claim because of the failure to assert
the claim in an earlier proceeding is overkill; (5) "the doctrine proceeds from the
incorrect assumption that mandatory party joinder is necessary to avoid unfairness
to absent defendants and others"; and (6) "critics question the premise that the
plaintiff controls the initial proceeding." Id.
inSee Ols, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644. The court reasoned that
[o]ur biennial review of proposed amendments to the Rules of Practice, which we will undertake next term, provides a suitable occasion
to review proposals for modifications of the entire controversy doctrine, expanded use of partyjoinder and other suggestions to improve
the administration ofjustice. The Civil Practice Committee, to which
[the Supreme Court] regularly looks for recommendations on proposed rule changes, has already appointed a subcommittee on the entire controversy doctrine. That subcommittee is the logical entity to
consider initially the various proposals concerning the doctrine.
Id. The supreme court again mentioned this process of review in a later section of
the opinion:
As previously indicated, our Committee on Civil Practice has appointed an Entire Controversy Doctrine Subcommittee to examine
exemptions from mandatory party joinder under the entire controversy doctrine. We are asking the Committee to broaden the examination to include all other aspects of the doctrine. Consistent with
167

our traditional practice, we shall provide the opportunity for the bar
and others to comment on any modification of the entire controversy
doctrine, including any proposed amendments to Rule 4:30A.
Id. at 449, 696 A.2d at 646. Despite these indications, there is still some doubt
whether the court will overrule CogdeiL Based on the fact thatJustice Stein was the

lone voice for overruling CogdeU4 some lawyers are uncertain about the court's
commitment to abandon the doctrine altogether. See id. at 450, 696 A.2d at 646
(Stein,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Cammarere, supra note
9, at 1 (arguing that because Justice Stein was the only justice to recommend overruling Cogdel/ the Olds decision might not be an indication that "the doctrine is living on borrowed time.").
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malpractice, preclusion of a subsequent lawsuit should be a remedy
of last resort. 70 Clearly, these high court comments indicate its willingness to consider abolishing a rule that is not meeting its stated
objectives.
It is evident that the Odks trio is a step in the right direction, but
the three decisions still leave many questions unanswered. There are
several other categories of professionals who stand in the same position as attorneys with regard to malpractice actions, yet these professionals have not received similar exceptions from the entire controversy doctrine.'
Many critics argue that it is unfair to exempt only
attorney malpractice actions from the confines of the entire controversy doctrine while failing to provide exemptions to actions against
other similarly situated professionals." 2 Other critics, however, support Olds, arguing that lawyers should be exempt from the reach of
the entire controversy doctrine because of their unique position in
adversarial proceedings.'" Still, it seems apparent that providing an
exception to the entire controversy doctrine solely for attorney malpractice actions will only create further confusion because the Olds
court did not elaborate on the scope of this exception. 4 Finally, a
See Ods, 150 NJ. at 448, 696 A.2d at 645-46.
ill See id. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644-45. The majority in O/ds confined its decision
to the doctrine's application to attorney malpractice actions, declining to address
whether other professionals should be excluded. See id. Such professionals might
include doctors, accountants, architects, engineers, and psychologists. See id., 696
A.2d at 644.
I" See id. at 451, 696 A.2d at 647 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that, although exempting attorney malpractice actions from the
entire controversy doctrine will calm the bar, such an exemption is hard to justify
when the doctrine can still be used to dismiss malpractice claims against other professionals); see also NancyJ. Moore, Implications of Circle Chevrolet for Attorney Mapractice and Attorney Ethics, 28 RUTGERs LJ. 57, 76-77 (1996) (questioning the wisdom of exempting attorney malpractice claims from the entire controversy doctrine
while continuing to apply the doctrine to accountants, architects, engineers, physicians, psychologists, and other professionals). BennettJ. Wasserman, a New Jersey
practitioner who sat on the New Jersey State Bar Association's Entire Controversy
Committee, discussed the fact that giving preferential treatment to attorneys would
hurt an already shaky public opinion of lawyers. See Wasserman, supra note 83, at S5.
13
See Editorial, Barbershop Quartet, NJ. LAw., Aug. 19, 1997, at 6 (arguing that
attorneys should receive a special exemption from the entire controversy doctrine
because "lawyers are different precisely because [their] unique role in dispute resolution is impaired by making [them] part of the dispute.").
17
Se Wasserman, supra note 83, at S-5. Because the lawyer serves the client in
several fiduciary roles, including advocate, adviser, accountant, investment consultant, and broker, and often receives the assistance of non-lawyers in doing so, it will
be unclear whether such non-lawyer fiduciaries should be exempt from the entire
controversy doctrine. See id.
170
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balancing of the interests relative to the entire controversy doctrine
shows that, despite the decisions in Od, and its progeny, the purposes served by the doctrine are outweighed by its negative implications."
There are several other contexts where there are substantial justifications for carving out additional exceptions to the entire controversy doctrine.Y6 Indeed, the supreme court has recognized several
other exceptions to the entire controversy doctrine outside the context of attorney malpractice actions.'" The problem with simply carving out exceptions to the entire controversy doctrine is clear where
do the exceptions end? There are feasible reasons for carving out an
exception in almost any context and almost any matter. For this reason, it is highly probable that the future will bring complete abandonment of the entire controversy doctrine. In its place, trial courts
can be given the discretion, with the aid of several other procedural
rules, to determine the result of failing to join a party in the original
action without being affirmatively obligated to declare the action
barred. 7 8 By doing so, the goals of the entire controversy doctrinenamely efficiency and fairness-can be more readily achieved."9
See Efficiency and Justice, supra note 94, at 26 (arguing that "[m]inimizing
litigation and conserving courts' energies are relative values to be weighed with other
17

values on the scale ofjustice; minimization of litigation is not an end in itself and it
has its price.").
176 See, e.g., Winokur, supra note 83, at 1 (summarizing
the position of the New
Jersey State Bar Association's Family Law Section that the entire controversy doctrine should be restricted in domestic cases). The divorce bar argued that applying
the entire controversy doctrine in the matrimonial context will result in increased
costs and delay. See id. Furthermore, the bar contends that carving out an exception for domestic actions would reduce malpractice suits because it would allow clients more time to "weigh the options." See id.; see also Cordell, supra note 90, at 7
(stating that applying the entire controversy doctrine in the matrimonial context is
.nonsensical").
I" See Olds, 150 NJ. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644 (noting that, "[flor policy considerations, [the court] has recognized that the doctrine should not apply in certain contexts, such as non-germane claims against a mortgagor in a mortgage foreclosure ... and indemnification claims when the putative indemnitee complies with"
NewJersey statutes). For examples of where the supreme court has held that the
entire controversy doctrine does not apply, see generally Joel v. Morroco, 147 N.J.
547, 688 A.2d 1036 (1997) (holding that in a zoning suit the entire controversy
doctrine did not preclude action against individual partners to enforce monetary
obligations under a settlement agreement where such partners were not joined in
the initial action) and Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Advance Die CastingInc., 150 NJ.
489, 500, 696 A.2d 666, 672 (1997) (declaring that the entire controversy doctrine
should not apply to indemnification claims when the putative indemnitee complies
with NewJersey statutory law).
8See Barbershop Quarte4 supra note 173, at 6. One example is NJ. Cr. . 4:37-4,
which mandates that a plaintiff who brings an action that is voluntarily dismissed
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VI. CONCLUSION

The entire controversy doctrine has traveled a rocky road during its short life. Although the intentions of the Supreme Court of
NewJersey in creating such a procedural rule were noble, the rule in
a practical setting did not turn out as well as intended. Thus, the
most prudent course for the NewJersey Supreme Court is to overrule
Cogdel altogether and exempt party joinder from the preclusive results of the entire controversy doctrine."' Rather than creating an
must pay the defendant's costs for the first, discontinued action if the plaintiff subsequently brings a second suit for the same claim. See id. Another suggestion is imposing extra costs on a plaintiff who fails to join a party in the original action; costs
similar to those imposed for abuse of the discovery process, including the costs of
recreating prior work, forcing witnesses to testify twice, and paying court costs. See
id. Justice Stein, dissenting in Olds, recommended several provisions that could be
strengthened to aid existing court rules in avoiding duplicative law suits. See Olds,
150 N.J. at 467-68, 696 A.2d at 656 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For example, N.J. Cr. R. 4:28 can be used to give a trial court more discretion
with regard to partyjoinder. See id. One commentator has suggested how Rule 4:28
could be used:
R. 4:28 authorizes dismissal of the first case if an indispensable party
cannot be joined and no practical means exist of avoiding the prejudice caused by the party's absence, but that judgment is to be made

with pragmatism and practicality. If an action proceeds without a
party whosejoinder was desirable, no bar exists to a subsequent action
against that omitted party.
"EffciencyandJustice, supranote 94, at 26. Justice Stein also suggested that NJ. Cr. R.
4:5-1(b), which requires lawyers to disclose the names of any parties that should be
joined in a lawsuit, could be used as a means of sanctioning lawyers who fail to advise the court that there might be more than one potential action. See Olds, 150 N.J.
at 468, 696 A.2d at 656 (Stein,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally,Justice Stein proposed that pre-trial conferences, as required under N.J. Cr.
R. 4:25-1, could be used as a means of determining what parties should be joined in
the litigation. See id.
e9
e Barbershop Quartet, supra note 173, at 6 (arguing that the majority in Olds
suggested that preclusion under the entire controversy doctrine might not be as advantageous as encouragingjoinder through active case management).
180 See Grayzel, supra note 6, at S-7 (noting that the New jersey State Bar Association and the Civil Practice Committee are reviewing the issue of whether to adopt
the recommendation made injustice Stein's dissent in Olds to overrule Cogdel altogether). Appellate Division Judge Sylvia B. Pressler, who headed the supreme
court's Civil Practice Committee, recommended that mandatory party joinder under the entire controversy doctrine should be ended completely. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 40. Judge Pressler stated: "The entire controversy doctrine's effect
has been that plaintiffs with valid claims have courthouse doors slammed on them
if they failed to name a party initially, and the only ones receiving justice are those
who hauled everyone into court." Id.; see alo Winokur, supranote 83, at 15 (quoting
Professor Howard Erichson of Seton Hall University School of Law School as stating
that "the best answer is not to carve out special exceptions for practice areas, but
rather to abolish the mandatory partyjoinder component of the entire controversy
doctrine.").
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absolute rule of preclusion, discretion with regard to case management should be given to the trial judge in determining which parties
should be joined and when an action should be dismissed for failure
to join a party."" The partyjoinder rule in NewJersey should resemble the federal joinder rules more closely so that failure to join an
indispensable party might result in the dismissal of an action, but
not in the preclusion of a subsequent action. Furthermore, certain
joinder rules could be subject to sanctions for failure to comply.'"
There are a variety of approaches that can be taken by the court to
discourage duplicative litigation and promote judicial economy. The
entire controversy doctrine, however, is clearly not the solution, and
the time has come to abandon it completely in favor of a more workable approach.
Stacey Eisenberg

le See Olds, 150 NJ. at 467-70, 696 A.2d at 656-57 (Stein, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (opining that Rule 4:28 should be amended to enhance the
authority of the trial court to orderjoinder of parties).
182 See 01s,150 NJ. at 468, 696 A.2d at 656 (Stein, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Rule 4:5-1(b) 's requirement of disclosure of absent
parties should be made subject to sanctions in order to give the trial judge all available information in deciding whetherjoinder of a party is required).

